Week Two

POLUS. The root of the demand for punishment of injustice, and its relation to Socrates’ extreme thesis on justice

February 27, 7 PM -8:30 pm

Socrates’ extreme thesis on justice is the claim that we all somehow believe (and so can’t refute) that the uttermost evil is to “get away” with doing injustice, and that “getting away” with injustice makes one more wretched than being (justly) punished for it or than suffering even the most terrible injustice (472e-474b). On the face of it, this seems naïve, and one might well sympathize with the cynical but indignant Polus: He breaks out laughing at Socrates and says that surely no one (among human beings) would assert the things Socrates says (473e). After all, isn’t a man who succeeds at his unjust plot to become tyrant much better off than had he been caught and suffered a series of graphic and truly gruesome punishments (473c-d)? Ignoring this point, Socrates does the astonishing feat of flipping the seemingly cynical Polus: Polus backs down, cooperates, and eventually concedes that Socrates at least seems to be right (479d-e). How is this possible? After all, at first Socrates had attempted an amoral argument and failed to subdue him (468e): that even a tyrant may lack power, if he is not able to do what he wishes (that is, what really is good for him) but only what seems good (466e, 468d-e, implying that the utmost evil is to be ignorant of one’s good). But Socrates succeeds with a moral argument, that getting away with injustice is the greatest evil. Why? Polus, like many people, believes that suffering injustice is worse than doing injustice, but that doing injustice is more shameful (or base) (474c). How is Socrates able to exploit this contradiction (and how exactly is it a contradiction)? What does this reveal about Polus and our own confusion about morality? If injustice is in some way “advantageous” (yet base), such that criminals profit from crime, then don’t we need to remove this “advantage” and shore up the hatred of injustice—which is shameful and base and somehow the utmost evil—through punishment. Socrates’ “correction” of this contradiction is that we should make sure criminals get away with injustice and live long (481a-b), so that they continue to suffer what we most deeply believe is the utmost evil (to live as bad men). Why does Socrates think this would appeal to Polus or follow his logic? What is behind Polus’ desire to punish (—taking seriously his fear of suffering injustice as the worst evil (469b))?

Reading: p. 49-70, 466a-481b

(The translation we are using is by James H. Nichols (Agora Editions, Cornell Univ. Press, 1998).)