CALLICLES. His, and our, radical inability to harmonize or “rationalize” our deeply held, contradictory beliefs about justice.

Swearing by the dog, the god of the Egyptians (Anubis, god of death), Socrates says the proof of this is our inability to refute his extreme thesis in favor of justice (482b-c). This divides life into two fundamental alternatives: the political way of life, which is the world of Plato’s Cave—of continued darkness and confusion over justice, or mere shadows of justice (if that, Rep. 517d) —and the life of philosophy, of those who, in the language of Plato’s Republic, know the idea of justice—which one does not learn in the assembly or from the many, 455a, 459a. (The philosophers live outside the city, in the “Isles of the Blessed,” 526c.)

Week Three

CALLICLES. Defense of Tyranny as True Justice, as Right by Nature.

March 5, 7 PM -8:30 pm

Is Callicles more serious about justice than Socrates? Callicles bursts in, and demands to know if Socrates is serious or joking about such things (e.g., that the wicked should be “punished” by encouraging them to indulge their wickedness, 481a-b—albeit only against others, 480e). Callicles divines that our lives, the lives of all human beings, would be turned “upside down” if Socrates is right, and we would be doing all the opposite of what we should (481c). And isn’t Callicles right that we have to defend ourselves and deter injustice against “those we care for” by actively punishing others, just as all political communities do, rather than concerning ourselves only with being pure and just (483b)? Isn’t Socrates “too good for this world”? Callicles doesn’t (or thinks he doesn’t) make the same mistake Polus had, of dividing the bad from the shameful or believing that doing injustice is more shameful than suffering injustice (which is worse), 482c-483a. Instead, Callicles says, “by nature, everything is more shameful that is also worse, such as suffering injustice, whereas by convention doing injustice is more shameful” (483a, cf. Socrates himself at 463d). This sophisticated distinction between nature and convention (or law) shows he has picked up some philosophy (484c-485e); should we then expect that he will turn out to be wise, harmonious, and clear-headed? Or has Callicles’ rationalistic “shamelessness” made him much more deeply confused about justice than Polus? (Among other things, Callicles attacks the injustice of “frightening” away would-be tyrants from rising up and enslaving us (483c)!) Perhaps Callicles can reveal how deep our own confusions run, and be a touchstone for us, even if not himself (486d). What is the source of Callicles’ confusion? Is he consistent or clear as to what he means by “the stronger” or the “more” that the stronger deserve to have (490b-491d)? What does he admire about tyrants? And why do you suppose he, influenced by philosophy, feels disgust and even hatred towards (grown) men engaged in it (485d)? If Callicles, like Polus, begins with a moral and not unreasonable fear of (or anger at) suffering injustice (486a-c, and esp. 511b), how does he end up going to such a shocking and seemingly amoral “solution”: the naked claim that “might makes right,” or rather, that might is right — and its extension within the city to favor tyrants (483d-484c)? Yet Callicles so much insists this open domination of the strong is truly right that he calls it “by Zeus, a law of nature” (483e). Is Callicles free of belief in justice, and if not, how do his shocking beliefs have any (genuine) relation to justice? even to piety (483e, “revealed,” 484a-b)?

Reading: p. 70-83, 481b-491d

(The translation we are using is by James H. Nichols (Agora Editions, Cornell Univ. Press, 1998).)